What the Bank of America and American Express National Bank enforcement actions mean for anyone building, running or testing an AML program.
Within weeks of each other last month, U.S. regulators placed Bank of America and American Express National Bank under enforcement actions for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti-money laundering (AML) rules. During a recent internal team session, Phillip Carratala, Senior Consultant with Integro Advisers, walked colleagues through both orders. His message: the failures were less exotic than the fines suggest, and the lessons reach well beyond the largest institutions.
Bank of America: a $1.2 billion warning
Carratala noted that the BofA enforcement action was a combined order from FinCEN, the OCC and OFAC, and totaled $1.2 billion in civil money penalties (CMPs). It followed a similar cease and desist order issued in December 2024 by the OCC against the bank for other BSA/AML violations, which the institution did not fully resolve. The 95-page document reviews conduct from January 2018 through 2025, and observed that the OCC’s $750 million share of the CMP is the largest fine the supervisory agency has ever issued.
As highlighted in the order, a core problem was the bank’s proprietary transaction monitoring system, the “Event Processor.” Investigations were opened only when events reached an aggregate weight of 20 points within the monitoring system, but the risk weights were poorly calibrated, as evidenced by the results of a 2024 look-back initiated by the bank with revised thresholds that found nearly 8,900 missed SARs covering more than $4 billion in activity. Regulators concluded the bank missed or delayed reporting over $5 billion in suspicious activity during the period under review, including transactions tied to Chinese money laundering networks (CMLN) and trade-based money laundering (TBML).
FinCEN also concluded the bank put revenues ahead of compliance. Carratala cited a bank study showing that recalibrating and fixing the system would have required 750 additional investigators to handle the increased alert volume.
Customer due diligence has to keep up with the customer
The regulators pointed out deficiencies with the bank’s high-risk customer due diligence process. The order’s central example involved three online auto auction customers, referred to as Customers A, B and C, which had inner-dealings with each other. Customer C was profiled by the bank as a “small-to-medium” business expecting $1 million to $4 million in annual sales; yet, in reality, it received hundreds of millions of dollars in cross-border wires, principally from Eastern Europe. The bank never re-profiled the account. When it finally closed Customer C’s accounts, it took no further action on customers A and B.
Two key takeaways for clients were flagged:
- Salvage and used-vehicle businesses deserve scrutiny, because vehicles can move value across borders and have been publicly linked to trade-based money laundering.
- Other red-flag patterns cited by the regulators that went unchecked by the bank included back-to-back credit card purchases at major retailers and shipping companies, large ACH and bill payments used to pay card balances, and large wires to counterparties in China.
Affiliates and vendors are not a free pass
Regulators also criticized Bank of America for applying simplified due diligence to correspondent bank accounts pertaining to its own foreign branches and affiliates, even though those entities served non-bank financial businesses such as money services businesses.
Under this simplified process, reduced requirements were imposed for the correspondent accounts of the bank’s foreign branches and affiliates. The regulators’ investigation, which focused on twelve of the bank’s foreign branches and affiliates, revealed that the “simplified” process caused the relevant due diligence files to (i) lack sufficient information about the anticipated activity and the account’s purpose; (ii) contained general statements about the nature of the foreign branch or affiliate’s business and markets served, such as “treasury services” or “cash management”; and (iii) had insufficient information about the supervisory regime applicable to the foreign branch or affiliate, often just merely providing the name of the local regulatory body.
The regulators also observed that the files often consisted of information irrelevant to the bank’s ability to detect and report potential suspicious activity conducted through the correspondent accounts (e.g., graphs depicting the price of the Bank’s parent holding company’s publicly traded stock). Carratala noted that the message was clear: being in-house does not lower the risk; and therefore, should not minimize the due diligence and monitoring a bank exercises over its foreign branches and affiliates.
OFAC made a parallel point. Most of the apparent sanction violations it identified involved payments routed through blocked banks. The payments were processed by an automated tool that relied on a third-party vendor’s directory. Each organization, OFAC stressed, remains responsible for its own compliance, no matter who supplies the technology.
American Express: $350 million for the fundamentals
The OCC’s 30-page order against American Express National Bank covered the period 2014 through 2025, and imposed a $350 million CMP on the institution. Carratala described the findings as more basic: gaps in risk assessment, ongoing customer due diligence, customer identification, suspicious activity monitoring, independent testing and training.
Carratala found the regulator’s observations and criticism of the bank’s risk assessment process to be most instructive. As noted, the OCC highlighted that the risk assessment focused on the bank’s smaller deposit account business and gave too little attention to its dominant card products. In other words, the bank “looked hardest where its risk was lowest.” The consent order also listed what a risk assessment methodology should include, such as specific risk categories, analysis of business units as well as of the enterprise-wide entity, assessment of affiliate relationships, an inventory of controls, and documented governance of risk rating overrides. This is a lesson that banks should keep in mind when conducting their own risk assessments.
Additionally, the order detailed numerous deficiencies with the bank’s BSA/AML compliance program, including, but not limited to:
- Customer Due Diligence and Identification: which had substantial gaps impeding the bank’s ability to understand the nature and purpose of customer relationships, conduct ongoing due diligence and know the true identity of each customer;
- Monitoring and Reporting: systemic breakdowns in the bank’s suspicious activity monitoring, investigation, and reporting processes that resulted in noncompliance with SAR filing requirements;
- Independent Staffing, Testing and Training: ineffectiveness of the internal audit group and independent testing to adequately monitor and test compliance with BSA/AML requirements. The regulator also noted that the bank had not historically supported the program with appropriate resources, including staff with commensurate skills, expertise, and training.
What you should do next
These recent enforcement actions send clear messages. Check that your risk assessment targets your real exposure, not just your tidiest business line. Recalibrate monitoring thresholds regularly, re-profile customers whose activity outgrows their expected profile, and apply full, risk-based diligence to affiliates and foreign branches, as well as vendor-supplied tools. Alberto de la Portilla, founder of Integro Advisers, added a note on timing: “What you failed to do this year or last year as a result of a more business-friendly regulatory environment is not going to save you down the road.” The review periods in these orders stretch back several years, and enforcement priorities can change.
Questions about your AML program or risk assessment? Get in touch with our firm.









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