Americans reported a record $15.9 billion in fraud losses in 2025, and much of that money crossed borders by wire, stablecoin or correspondent account. US regulators now expect banks and their foreign partners to treat scam proceeds as an AML risk, and to staff for it.
On October 13, 2026, the US Treasury announced more than $1.21 billion in penalties against Bank of America. FinCEN assessed $1.2 billion, the OCC $750 million and OFAC $11.6 million. Among the findings: the bank failed to conduct due diligence on correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions and failed to report activity indicative of fraud.
The resourcing findings stand out. The OCC said the BSA Officer and staff lacked sufficient skills and expertise. FinCEN said the bank “prioritized its revenues and minimized the impact on its required compliance resources.”
Scams have become a money laundering problem
The Bank of America case is the largest signal, but not the only one. On September 3, 2026, FinCEN issued Alert FIN-2026-Alert005 on digital asset investment scam centers run by transnational criminal organizations “predominantly in Southeast Asia.” Reported US losses to these scams rose from $907 million in 2021 to $7.2 billion in 2025.
The alert traced roughly $751.7 million in cyber scam funds sent through international ACH between October 2024 and June 2026. About $113.2 million went first to the Americas. FinCEN asks institutions to use the key term “FIN-2026-SCAMCENTERS” in related SARs.
The broader numbers point the same way. The FTC told Congress on March 25, 2026 that consumers reported $15.9 billion in fraud losses in 2025, with investment scams alone at $7.9 billion. The FBI’s 2025 Internet Crime Report put crypto-related losses at $11.4 billion, and crypto ATM losses up 58%.
Why the correspondent chain is exposed
Scam proceeds rarely stay in the victim’s bank. They move by wire to mule accounts, through payment providers and stablecoin off-ramps, and often through a foreign bank’s US dollar account. Each hop adds an institution that sees only part of the story.
This puts regional banks based in international banking sectors such as Miami and New York in a difficult spot. Many serve foreign customers, provide correspondent services to international banks and finance trade.
For Latin American respondent banks, the stakes are access itself. A U.S. correspondent that cannot get comfortable with a respondent’s fraud controls has one simple option: exit the relationship. FinCEN’s alert explicitly reiterates Section 312 due diligence for foreign correspondent accounts, and the Bank of America findings show what happens when that diligence lapses.
How a scam becomes a payment pattern
Most scams follow the same four moves. Each one leaves a trace that a bank, or its correspondent, can detect.
- Pretend. The scammer poses as a bank, a government agency, an investment platform or a romantic partner. For the institution, the signal is a customer sending funds to a new, unrelated beneficiary that claims authority or opportunity.
- Pressure. Urgency drives the transfer before the victim can check. Look for first-time large wires, rapid account changes and customers who say they were told to act today.
- Isolate. Victims are told to keep the payment secret from their bank. Front-line staff may notice coached answers; FinCEN lists customers who say a purported government official directed an international wire.
- Pay. Funds move by wire, stablecoin, crypto ATM or cash courier, the rails hardest to reverse. Downstream, they surface as mule accounts, shell companies or fraudulent MSBs, which is where correspondent monitoring comes in.
The same pattern repeats in investment, imposter and “recovery” scams. Institutions that encode it in their monitoring rules and training catch it earlier.
What US banks and their LatAm partners should be able to show
- Monitoring rules built on the red flags. Translate FinCEN’s alert into scenarios: first-time international wires directed by a “government official,” payments to recovery services, and flows linked to stablecoin off-ramps. Test them above and below the line before go-live.
- Respondent due diligence that asks about fraud. US correspondents should ask how respondents detect scams and mule accounts. Respondents should be ready to respond with documented controls, SAR-equivalent reporting data and independent testing results.
- Staffing tied to measurable demand. Examiners assess whether resources match the bank’s size, complexity and risk, not a benchmark headcount. A defensible model starts from alert, case and EDD volumes, multiplies them by measured handle times and divides by net productive hours per analyst. The gap between required and filled positions, by function, goes to the board.
- Technology as a capacity lever, not a substitute. Model tuning, triage automation and drafted case narratives can free analyst time. Treat each change as model risk: validate it, document the rationale, and hold headcount until savings are sustained.
- Governance that reopens the model. Refresh the staffing assessment quarterly. New correspondent relationships, new markets or a FinCEN alert should trigger a review, with escalation thresholds for alert aging and vacancy rates.
The bottom line
Scam proceeds move through the same correspondent channels that regional banks and Latin American institutions depend on for US dollar access. Regulators have made clear that fraud detection, correspondent diligence and adequate compliance resources are part of the plethora of AML obligations. Institutions that demonstrate a documented method will be better placed when regulators, auditors or examiners ask questions.
Integro Advisers helps financial institutions and multinational companies design risk-based AML/CFT programs, including correspondent banking due diligence, fraud typology assessments and BSA/AML staffing reviews.









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